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r:tbstract 
A high public debt oftt'm HnpJius the hli! J 1 (f';'W18SS and the ability of 
the goverrnent to tax tp':~i(jent'2. urpl ici tly rather than 
explicitly. For'lnstarce, ;-, . the Tre,;j,~:;;.ury has used the Central 
Bdf",:" to extract seignorage on ,;!. .Jst.3JJlc'd t:<{':.;;.i.~::" This mechanism need 
rot e1 iminate the str'aightfon"'Jdr Cl::'OlHCr:: r ·,::Jc:f iei t financing in the 
"financial repression" Ii teratun~ namely negative real interest rates. 
A decanposi tiol"! of the growth of tre rea.l put,) le debt in Portugal from 
1976 to 1987 suggests the specific condi ti,ons of this "high public debt" 
country and the awror:wiate ::~olut.ior"=-~,. 11': this partiaJlar case, the 
solutions presented by the ·.;pvernnent r)o t'lOt seal! sufficient to 
stabilize the debt-to-income r'atio. 
* A shorter ver sion IAJaS pre;3ented at, tre 3c:llogm i"'leetings of the 
European Econonic Asscciatior! ,,~nd W} 11 appear 1f~. tre ~~.r:~9.11 ~99.r.m.~.g 
8§Y.tE3~. Salle of the mater'ial IrJas also presented in the Seminar for 
Forelgn Bankers orga.nized oy tl~le 8arc:o r'or't.ugues do Atlantica in 
VilarraJra as v..ell as in a senli.n.:~r Or t.hE-~ ~.Ior LUgJeS8 econcxny sponsored by 
the Center for InterTlational DevelopmenT. ~:;tu~ie3:1 n Lisbon. lr.Ie are 
gr'ateful to partlcipants for c::onnlent~.:, ,)n~ to Miguel 8eleza for helpful 
discussion. 
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1. Introduction 
Government deficits are often associated with controls and implicit 
taxes. A high public debt thJs in-plies the willingness ard the ability 
of the g:>vernnent to t.a~" da-nestle resider)t':.: i rnplici tly rather than 
explici tly. The straightforwa.rd source ot deficj t finarcing in the 
"finarcial repression" Ii terature is i ve r'eal interest rates. 
f't1oreover, the Treasury may use the Central 8o.nk to extract seigroragE9 on 
a sustained basis. A standard decorrposi tion of the growth of the real 
public debt in Portugal from 1976 to 1987 srJOWS that tre relative 
magnitude of both sO..H'ces depends on whether foreign borrowing and an 
inplici t interest rate tax i~::. taken into ac'Count. There are four phases 
dJring this period, which roughly corre.::pondt.c the macroecoromic r.')Olicy 
stances of the successiva goverments: 1976/79 and 1981/85, expansion 
follo.-e::l by external adjustrnent, 1980 ;5l.nd 1986/87 expansion coupled with 
anti-inflationary adjustment. 
In 1983, as part of the: extern_~.l adjustment program, trere was a 
considerable ircrease in the da'ne5,t.ic nominal interest rates. The 
cpening of banking to new private agents was also decided, after ten 
years of exclusively public commercial banks. Nevertheless, interest 
rates have remaired very low and the conmercial banking system contin.JeS 
to be virtually fully nationalized. Indeed, the interest rate charged 
on the OOnestic public debt is adninistratively fixed, together wi th the 
term structure of interest rates. Here we interpret the system of 
rronetary control 'based on credi t ceilings as involving an io-plici t tax 
on the interest payrnents of the Treasury to the Central Bank. 
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The implici t tax makes financial 1iber-alization at the same time 
more urgent and riskier for the stability of the bankir~ system, mainly 
if the governnent deficit contirues a high proportion of ootput. Given 
the expected financial liberalization which is associated with the 
objective of an European interT)3l market in 19<:12, this trade-off has 
irrportant irrplications for policy making Ln Por'tugal. While the 
specific condi tiorls of each one of the OlElrrOer countries involved warrant 
attention, the approach here adapts work on Italy wi th goc::d results [1]. 
2. Public Debt and tre Central Bank 
The high public debt in Portugal is mt due to war. The colonial 
war effort fran 1961 to 1974 never raised trlt? debt to output (GOP) ratio 
above 22% and it had fallen to less tran 18% at the tire of the April 
25th, 1974 Revolution. Goverrtr'lE9nt bc>rTOIAIing INaS not due to the 
"naturall! recessions or business cycles of the seventies either. Rather 
it was due to the nationalization of banking and heavy ird..Jstry in 
1974/75. These massive national izatiort3) enacted wi thout c::arpensation 
dJring a period of revolutior~ry turmoil~ were frozen into a 
Consti tution voted in 1976 as a means of ensuring the transition of 
Portugal tcwards a "classless society". Only in 1988 did this ecorcrnic 
consti tution begin to be amended. Against this background, expansionary 
demand policies eventually required external adjustment and a program 
was agreed upon with the IMF in 1978/79. Afterwards. exparsion resumed 
and, in 1980/82, policies were again "out-af-phase" relative to the 
world business cycle, especially the Eurc;.pean economies. Throogho.Jt, 
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the gnowth of public debt was facilited by a dependent Central Bank and 
a system of direct monetary control based on credit ceilings. 
Chart 1 shows the Portuguese public debt as a proportion of gnoss 
domestic product from 1970 to 1987, together with the domestic debt and 
the debt held by the Central Bank. Chart 2 fccuses on the domestic debt 
and its dec::arposi tion between debt held privately - that is to say 
mostly by commercial banks - and again debt held by the Central Bank. 
The Charts shaN that tre Central Bank COTlX>nent began to rise af ter the 
1974 Revolution. D.Jring the first IMF stabilization program, the rise 
was interrupted. Then, in 1980, there was a drq:), offseting the capital 
gain due to the revaluation of the gold reserves. The accumulation of 
ooth COTlX>nents of public debt accelerated 5Ub~ently, but after' the 
second IMF stabilization program agr'eed in 1983-84, the Central Bank 
COTlX>rent began to decline. ThE? external surplus of 1986/87 was a 
factor in the decline of the Treasury moneta.ry base, but there is also 
increasing awareness that the "high public debt" may reverse the 
anti-inflationary program initiated in late 1985, which managed to OJt 
the rate of increase of the output def Jator fran 20% in 1985 to 11% in 
1987, trus bringing ex post r~eal interest rates up from -11% to -1%. 
Mearwhile, the official governnent budget defici t net of interest fell 
from 4% to 2% of ootput over the sarre period_ 
The Charts shol.! the unlnterrupted growth of the debt held by tre 
private sector (BB, including the external debt of state-owred 
enterprises) and the decrease of privately reId domestic debt (8) cUring 
the IMF stabilization package. Tre nationalizations inciJced finarcial 
irresponsabili ty on the part of state-Of..\Ined industrial entreprises, 
which always were able to borra..J f ran the state-owned COllYleH"-~ial banks. 
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Because they could easily f in.:11"ce t.hej r rllaS<:'.l'/e i r;ve::-:,tment.s, they encted 
up with ircreasing operating delict r.s, :,:;vJ8111(i<;'l the growing borrOlJing 
recp..Ji rement. of the centra.l governrnent and Icc,;:: autt-Kj/ :L i~les wi th loans 
never to be repaid by industrial entrepri sc:;.:; iTI difficul ty [2J.. As a 
consequence, proceeds fran trIG pr'iva.tiz,3tion of state owned entreprises 
anro.Jrceci in 1988 will be in part.3,] lo::-;::,~Le(j t.O clebt reduction. In face 
of the rTOJnting debt problem~. tl'''flJu';JI, onr..::e the f orner stockhold3rs are 
c:::arpensateci, the proceeds sh:Juld be excJ.u C'! l'y cievot.ed to retiring 
public debt. 
Until 1976, the public debt held b~· the (::e,;ntra.l Bank included the 
aa:::::o.Jnts of the Monetary Fund of the Escudo Area. This Fund ma.naged tre 
finarcial 'flOl.NS arrong Portugal and its rormer cole,! lles, 1. e.. arrong the 
Portuguese ESOJdo and the cu r rency of each celJ. ony . Though the stocks of 
the debt asscx::iated to this Fund are easily identified in tre Central 
Bank acca.Jnts, and are therefore e:x:cluoed from the d3bt fig...Ir8S, its 
interest flo-l.S are not. Therefon~) interest fig.Jres reeded to CCfI1)lJte 
cbnestic seigniorage in the per-iod 1970-5 could not be obtained. As a 
consecp.Jence, the seigniorage per formed covers the period 
1976-87. 
In 1980. tre Treasury ,jecjded to r'8value the stcx:::k of gold 
reserves. The book value VJaS put at US$ 25::' per troy ounce, up frcrn US$ 
35 (this was r8J:)eated 1n 1988). rhus, tJ!e public debt held by the 
Central Bank was significantly reduced, given the size of the stock 
(rrore than 6(X) tons) while the debt held by the pr'lvate sector contirued 
to ircrease. As rrsntioned> both tllE3 rate and the base of seigniorage 
were dramatically redJced in 198:). To 3\IOid orobl8/1"r.s of interpretation 
concerning this episcde, we take 1980 d:3 a single phase. It also turns 
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3. The interbank market and irnpl ici t t,;t>(<3S 
The interbank rnarket in f...-or t.ugdl fu 1 i' j it,::, two roles: (i) the usual 
t-ole of the market fat 
role of absorbing and rerrunerating t hE: pnt(~nt i~:.)<ce:::,:::, llquidi ty of the 
banking systerrl. Excess liQjldi L,j'l~3e-:'frnm tJ-e very mechanism of 
direct rronetary control. 
The banking '5;y~stem h;J.S been the a1m::·"; t exclusive market for 
':::' tently tried to keep 
real cieposit rate positive in order to t~ll,rJl·),te savings. Furtherrror'e. 
credit ceilings an: e:::.lablished on '-:l.fl in(;li\/l(jUaJ ba.nk basis. according 
to the arrount and type of \jE:;,PO~ 1 ts bank~~ hd,\'f' I-j their r:::ortfolio, as 
well as trei r aNn cap i taJ n:::suu n:::e'.3. 
stirrulate bank c.ieposi t::;, :::;~€ci':'111 y time d€j~xY 1 t..::,. 
Demand for credit. ~ver.frT:(:jlit::rl ly ;,,';><:CRf'X::!<':;; what can be afforded 
by a r'esponsible monetar'y pn::>gr.::mri ng, 
phase of strong growth of out/=)ut dnd ill\,/t':>:~tlTlent that begai'l in late 1985. 
The alloc::ation of credi t t() U1€'; pn::A'1l.JCT i.eJi i kt:' to be fu rther 
SQ,Jeezed dJe to trl8 debt behaviur uf Lh 
preeerrpts a larYE shar'e of total credi t "i\/di ld(3 to the f:;corony. 
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As a conseq.Jerce, the Central Bank has no alternative but to freeze 
the potential excess liquidi ty which end::, up Hi t.he banking system. In 
order to avoid the (rational) response on the part of carrnercial banks 
of turning d::wn requests for dep:Jsi ts, siree these cannot fincJ their way 
into loans, the Central Bank has relltJarded the above mentioned excess 
liQ.Jidi ty at reasonable interest r:::!.tes. Siree interbank interventions 
have been ircreasing at a fast rate in recent. years, the effective 
interest rate on the public debt held by the Central Bank has remained 
negative in real terms. This fTk3intai ns 1 reasuty seignorage at a higher 
level than VOJld be the case wi thaJt taking into account the interbank 
market [3]. 
Low (or negative) I~eal intei~e~::t rates then irrply a tax, made 
possible by: a) directly if1lX)sing ncmii'lal interest rates far belON 
market rates before 1985 ard b) by maintaining system of di rect rronetary 
control which requires increasing interbank market interventions by the 
Bank of Portugal since 1986. 
4. Tile aca.JfJl..Jlation equation 
The cJel:>t aca.Jrrulation equation states that, in each period, the 
change in the stock of outstarding debt 8Q..Jals the primary deficit plus 
interest payments: 
[1J d)=J+F 
where D the stock of debt at the begi nning of the period 
J interest payments 
F the primary deficit 
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Unfortunately, a debt accumulation equatIon like [1] canrot be 
built directly fron official figures b,y' the Bank of Portugal 
and the Ministry of Finance. In effect, tr-ere is a J:)ersistent tradition 
in Portugal of excluding from the General Goverrrnent budget part of its 
financial ~rations, narrely transfers to ::.tate-OrJned enterprises (sa 
called "Treasury operations")" Most of these transfers., which appear 
only in the PSBR, are disgJised as loar'tS even though the probability of 
thei r repaymet is widely ackro~'-Jledged to be z,sr'o. Also, m:we rE3Cently, 
the General Goverment decided to take over the debt of sane extirct 
public enti ties, such as the Housing Develq:)(fSnt Fund and the Supply 
Fund. As a resul t, the steck of ootstanding public debt has increased 
ei ther di rectly by the alTO..Jnt of thE: debt of trose entities. or 
indirectly through the corr8Sf:Onding increasf:: in the PSBR rendered 
necessary to service it. ThEwefore, nei ther the PSBR is the exact 
CXXJnterpart of the budget defici t, mainly due to above mentiored 
Treasury operations, ror the yearly char-ge in the stock of outstanding 
debt is et:J.Ial to the corresponding year PSBR, mainly we to de!bt take 
over operations or other unreported debt operatlOns. 
We distinc;uish danestic (DB) fran foreign debt (EB) and privately 
held det::>t (BB and 8) from danestic debt held by the Central Bank (MT): 
[2] 	D=OB+EB=B+MT+EB=BB+MT 
We can then rewri te [1 J in ter-rns of ei ther danestic or total 
privately held debt: 
[3] 	c[)=d3+dEB+dMT=JB+JEB+JMT +F =d38+c:t1T ::JB8+JMT+~-
We th..Js ootain a measure of the implit~d primary defici t, F1 as: 
[4]dBB=Fl+JBB-(dMT-JMT) 
. We net ,from JMT interest payments of the Centrdl Bank ~D commercial 
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banks d.Je to adninistrative controls namely interest rate subsidies and 
tre q:,eration of tre interbank market, J/VC. The gross irrpl ici t rate is 
then ig=JMT/MT and the net rate in=( JMT-JIVC)/I"1T.We define MT as tre 
Treasury roonetary base or the base of the domestic seigrDrage tax and 
the net asset aCOJrrulation as the tax rate. Using the net rate, Wf3 have 
TAX=ct1T/MT-in. Using the gross rate IIJe have TAG=dMT/MT-ig. Tre varioos 
measures are reported in Table 2. Using tle~-.e defini tions, we have: 
[5J 	 cl3B=Fl+JBB-MT*TA(~=F2+JB8-Ml*TAX 
where F2=Fl+JI"'C 
If we take as given external borrowing, we can express the 
ac::c::um.Jlation of clc:mestic privately reId c1e\:::,t as a func:tion of the 
defici t net of foreign debt accunulation and the net acculTlJlation of 
Central Bank debt: 
[6] 	 cI3=F3+JB- TAG*MT::F4+J8- TAX*t'1T 
where F3=Fl+JEB-dEB 
and F4=F3+JMC 
We can also interpret these variables in real terrrE (using the 
consumer price incfex or the gcIp deflator) but here INe ~ the 
gnowth of privately held public debt as a proportion of nominal income 
Y: 
[7] 	 d(BB/Y)=Fl/Y+(ibb-dY!Y)BB/Y-TAG*I"'IT/Y::F2/Y+(ibb-dY/Y)BB!Y-TAX*MT/Y 
where ibb=JBB/BB 
If we focus on domestic debt and the net interest payments, we get: 
[8J 	 d(B/Y)=F4/Y+(ib-dY/Y)B/Y-TAX*MT/Y 
where ib=JB/B 
The primary deficit obtained fran the debt acCtJlTlJlation 8Q..Jality is 
E!lQJal to tre difference between the stc...ck of outstancJing debt at the end 
and at the beginning of each year mirus the interest paid ruring the 
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year. Chart 3 shows the difference between the actual primary deficit 
and the two alternative measures of the implied deficit F1 and F4, i.e. 
total debt and gross interest and domestic debt and net interest 
payments. An adjusted actual primary defici t ircluding Teasury 
c:perations sirce 1984 is in Table 5 and the fi<;P.Jres wi th the total debt 
and net interest are in Table 6 below. 
5. Seigniorage and other contribution to defici t financing 
Measuring seignorage as the change in the rronetary base as % of CDP 
- tt-e usual measure - shc:'ws a decline fran around 6% to 1% in 1984/86, 
even trough, thrOJgh the external su rplus, it rose to 3% in 1987 (chart 
4). Treasury seigrorage is negative only In 1980, but excluding the 
interbank market, the gross measure is also negative in 1986/87. The 
net measure vanishes in 1987 [4J. 
The averages for the carponents of the monetar'y base ret:XJrted in 
Table 3 obscure some year-to-year variations~ where the decomposition of 
the change in the Treasury rronetary base s~ a falling demand 
St..JPP)rted by a rising veloci ty) until 1987. when real ITDnetary base rose 
at 10% and, dJe again to the external surplus, the Treasury rronetary 
base fell 23% in relation to total" 
As mentioned., there are fOJr phases sir"Ce 1976, which have a roogh 
cornesponderce with goverrroents: socialist until 1979, refonmist in 1980 
and 1986/87 and a mixture in-between. Tables 1-7 presents the phase 
averages. 
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Table 1 srcw:. how the expansion periods were periods of intense 
foreign borrONing, whereas, in 1980 and in 1986/87, foreign debt was 
repaid. This is evident in the rise of the cbnestic share frOll 48% in 
1981/85 to 62% in 19f!J::,/87. 
Table 2 st'ors h:::Jw t.he irrplici t interest rates on privately held 
debt c:x::xypare wi th the rates on Central Bank debt. External debt was 
alrrost c:x:::>n::essional in 1976/79 wi th a 2% irrplici t rate relative to 10% 
on cbnestic debt and 5% net on Central Bank debt. Afterwards, the rate 
on cbnestic debt remained at about 12?6, the gross rate on Central Bank 
debt at 15-16%!J and profi ts of the Central Bank at 2% of the Treasury 
I'OC)netary base. Conversely, during the 1gSl/aS expansion phase, external 
debt ircreased fran 7-8% to 115'6, and net Central Bank debt fell fran 6% 
to -2%. The major source of the difference between the net interest 
rate and the profits of tre Centra] Ban!·:. has to do wi th the spread on 
foreign exchange operations as well as the ca.pi tal gains and losses on 
foreign exchange reserves. 
Table 3 shcJws that the total monetary ba.se gr'8W at ab:::lut 4% until 
it fell to 29(; in 1986/87, whereas the Treasury rronetary base - excluding 
the odd year of 1980 - fell from an average ircrease of 50% p.a. in 
1976/79 to 32% in 1981/85 and less than 2% in 1986/87. The fall in real 
rooney balarces in 1981/85 during the expansion phases is also 
roteworthy, together with the remarkable decline in rcminal inc::ane 
gra;.,th fran 23% to 21%, in spi te of an increase in real growth from 1 to 
4%. 
Table 4 shc::J..Js that the Treasury seignorage tax base has gr~n fran 
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20% to 23?6 frOll 1976/80 to 1981/87 but that the gross rate became 
negative dJring the anti-inflationary phase and· was more than halved 
dJring the second expansion phase. thus halving seignorage as a 
percentage of output. The net figures are less dramatic, even tho.Jgh 
seigrorage falls from 8-6% in 1976/79 and 1981/85 to 1% in 1986/87. 
Table 5 compares the four implied deficits with the official figure 
and the adjusted one. The latter srows a surplus in 1980 but a larger 
defici t in 1986/87. The decline miror for the net figure using total 
debt ard is actually revel-sed IrkJen domestic debt is used, because of the 
intense repayment of foreign debt. 
Overall~ the Tables show a situation which appears more distorted 
than the si tuation in Italy before the so-callf3d "divor'caP! between Barca 
and Tesoro in 1981. The irrrease of 5% p. <.=.\. on avera<;te in the debt to 
incane ratio, clearly unsustainable, i~s recorded despite negative real 
interest rates and high graNth rates, so trlClt the differerce is abo.Jt 
4%. The fall in the implied defici t from 13% in 1981/85 to 10% in 
1986/87 is less dramatic than thE~ fall in Treasury seignorage fran 6% to 
1%. Oree the actual defici t is netted out, a lange residJal remains, 
underscoring tre severe lack of correspondence between the official 
fi9Jre net of interest and the ccmponents of debt accunulation. 
Overall, the figures reported in Tables 6 and 7 show highly 
negative real interest rates high primary deficits and high seignorage. 
The differerce between the real interest rate and the rate of growth of 
output is negative througtJ::x..Jt tre period. The same can be said of the 
covered interest differential with the dollar [5J. 
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With total debt and the gross interest fig.,J res , as in the left 
panel of Table 6, the i~lied romina.l rate on privately-held debt rises 
fran 9% to 10% between 1985 and 1987, whereas the one paid on the public 
debt held by the Central Bank falls from 19% to 15%, irfl)lying that the 
contribution of seigrorage as a propor~tion of output fell frOTl 3% in 
1985 to -17% in 1987. The irrplied def t, in turn, fell fran 38% to 
13% of ootput, the difference with the actual fig.,Jres being rue to 
external borrOlJing and adjustments. When Central Bank interest payments 
to the banking system are taken into account, the implied effective 
interest falls fran 2% to -3%, and the contl~ibution of seignorage as a 
prq::x)rtion of ootput falls from 14% to zero, whereas the i~lied deficit 
fall fran 50% to 20% of output. When all tre profits of the Central 
Bank are ircluded in the clef i ni tion of the:: seignorage tax rate, tre 
seigrorage falls from 1976 to 1979, and frC)ffl 1986 to 1987 and increases 
fran 1980 to 1985. 
Using doTestic debt only as in Table 7, the seignorage tax base 
remains high at 239o, so that, despite tre brutal fall in the tax rate 
fran 26% in 1981/85 to :3% in 1986/87} total seignorage remains 1% of 
OJtput. 
6. Solutions to the public debt problem. 
The Portuguese public debt situation is potentially serious since 
there has been no connection between debt management and macroeconc::.mic 
policy. No clear policy exists wi th respect to tre mix between internal 
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and external borra-Jil'1£J or between stnrt and lol'1£J term debt. 
Ci~mstances, especially the existence and size of the spread required 
by foreign banks, dictated the option of borrowing or repayil'1£J. Tre 
absence of tax smoothing is also evident in the transi tion arrangements 
for tt-e irrplementation of the inr-Drne tax In 1989. Given the preference 
for implicit taxation this is of course not surprising. 
Tt--e consequence is that debt 1'::; :ir'creasingly shot~t-tenn, in a 
period of transi tion to indirect. methods of monetary control and 
finarcial liberalizationM Moreover, the pa.ttern of expendi ture and 
reverue contirues to be such trl3t the size or prllnat'y surpluses is not 
ef1O.lgh to effectively curb the growth of public debt. 
Giavazzi and Spaventa (1988) ha,ve a thorou(]h discussion of the 
Italian experience and of the solutions to the debt problem usually 
cited, which are the ones appropriate to the country's experience. Here 
we state five solutions: 
a) To default; 
b) To introd.Jce a once-and-for-all extraordinary tax on wealth 
(capi tal levy); 
c)To generate inflation to reduce the real value of nominally 
deronina ted debt; 
d) To create surpluses by r'educing expendi ture and tr-ansfers and/or 
in::::: reasi I'1£J taxes; 
e) To privatize. 
The PortugJese goverm)8nt h2t3 annaJnced a combination of d) and e) 
but the goverrnE3nt forecast do not generate prirnary surpluses sufficient 
to stabilize the debt to output ratio by 1992, 
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Notes 
[1] See Bruni, Porta and Penati ( lO/d8) and Salvemini and Salvemini 
(1987)M While we focus on Purtugal. sorne of the issues may also be 
relevant for the other twJ "rewly-integrating (;()untr'ies" of the European 
Cc:mrunity - Greece and Spain -, as argued in Macedo (1988 d) and, 
indeed, for many LOCs as suggested by McK j nnon (1988). 
[2J The debt to ootjout ratio which was abou t 70% in 1987 IAOUld be 
considerably ircreased if it included tre g.~aranteed debt of state-DINned 
entreprises" By i tself, the debt of the nationalized electric ~r 
c.c::trpany aa:::o.Jnts for 25% of tre total public debt. 
[3J The situation of ~u~.j\J~;~C commercial banKs is analyzed in Macedo 
(1988 a and c). See also and Crespo (1988). 
[4J This is tr-.e cash flow measure used Cross (1988), wro contrasts it 
wi th an q:,portuni ty cost meaSLJr'e like 100 MB. 
[5] Using data fran Septerrber 1982 to January 1988~ Frankel (1988) finds 
an average real interest rate differential wi trl the dollar of -3.9% 
whereas for 25 caJntries (mast of it developed), the average is -1. 7%. 
Tre coefficient of variation for Por<tugal is (in absolute value) 2.9 
whereas the sarrple average is 3.7. This suggests controls to prevent 
capi tal outfla-8~ as discussed in Macedo (1988b and d). 
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Table 1 - Portuguese real public debt: Total and Domestic 
+---------+---------------------------------------------------+ 
% ch. Contribution of: Dom priv % ch. 
real ------------------ debt/ real 
I tot priv External Domestic tot priv dam priv
•I pub debt debt debtI 

I (BB/P) B/BB (B/P)
I 
Years : 
: 1=2+3 2 3=4*5 4 5 
+---------+---------------------------------------------------+ 
:1976/9 2.8% 9.2% -6.4% 58.7% -10.5%: 
:1980 31.0% -8.2% 39.1% 55.2% 70.9%: 
:1981/5 14.7% 10.1% 4.6% 48.0% 9.1%: 
:1986/7 15.5% -4.5% 20.0% 62.3% 32.2%: 
+---------+---------------------------------------------------+ 
Table 2 - Implicit Interest rates 
+---------+----------------------------------------------------------------+ 
PRIVATELY HELD CENTRAL BANK (MT) 
Years Total Domestic External Gross Net of Profits 
(BB) (B) (EB) (ig) interbank 
(in) 
+---------+----------------------------------------------------------------+ 
:1976/79 7.5% 10.1% 2.3% 6.3% 5.4% 5.8%: 
:1980 10.8% 12.6% 7.3% 6.2% 0.9% 0.2%: 
:1981/85 11.6% 12.1% 11.4% 15.3% 5.8% 2.1%: 
:1986/87 10.7% 12.5% 7.7% 15.9% -1.7% 1.7%: 
+---------+----------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Table 3 - Components of the Monetary Base 
+ -------- + ---------------------------------------------------------------+ 

% ch. in real stock of % ch. in Change Change 
total monetary base ratio in in 
--------------------------- Treas. Treasury total 
% ch. % ch. % ch. to total monetary monetary 
GDP real base's Total monetary base base 
Years deflator GDP veloc. base % of GDP 
1 2 3 4=2-3 5 6=1+4+5 7 
+ ------- + ---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
: 1976/79 18.7% 5.1% 11.6% -6.5% 37.6% 49.8% 3.7%: 
: 1980 : 17.6% 4.0% 1.9% 2.1% -52.2% -32.4% 4.0%: 
: 1981/85 : 20.0% 1.0% 6.3% -5.3% 17.1% 31.8% 3.9%: 
: 1986/87 : 14.7% 4.4% 3.9% 0.5% -13.6% 1.6% 2.2%: 
+ -------- + ---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Table 4 - Treasury seignorage 
+---------+--------------------------------------------------------+ 

I I I 
I I I 
YEARS :TAX BASE : rate total % GDP : 
% of :------------------- -----------------­
GDP : TAG TAX GROOS NET 
+---------+--------------------------------------------------------+ 

:1976/79 18.8%: 43.5% :14.3% 7.6% 7.8%: 
:1980 20.2%: -38.6% -33.3% -7.8% -6.7%: 
~1981/85 23.0%: 16.6% 26.0% 3.5% 5.8%: 
:1986/87 23.2%: -14.3% 3.3% -3.3% 0.8%:I 
+---------+--------------------------------------------------------+ 

Table 5 - Primary Deficits as % of GDP 
+---------+-------------------------------------------------------+ 
: : PRIMARY DEFICITS : 
: Years: ACTUAL ADJUSTED *: 
I 
I F1 F2 F3 F4 
+---------+-------------------------------------------------------+ 
:1976/79 8.9% 9.1% 6.8% 7.0% 5.2% 5.2%: 
:1980 -1.0% 0.0% -0.3% 0.8% 6.3% -7.4%: 
:1981/85 9.8% 11.8% 5.9% 7.9% 5.2% 5.3%: 
:1986/87 5.3% 9.0% 5.9% 9.7% 0.5% 2.2%: 
+---------+-------------------------------------------------------+
* Excluding gold revaluation (ESC 168.7 bn in 1980) including Treasury 
operations since 1984 (ESC 80 bn in 1986/87) 
Yable 6 - Break down of the change of the ratio of Total Public Debt to GDP 
t---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
ch. Contribution of: 

: Debt/GDP 

---------------------------------------------------------: 
ratio Debt GROSS NIT 
IGDP Growth & Pl/GDP Seignio- f2/GDP Seignio-
Years (BB/Y) (r-g) ratio Interest + rage/GDP rage/GDP* 
1=4+5-6 
=4+7-8 2 3 4=2*3 5 6 7 8 
+---------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
:1976/79 -0.4~ -16.3% 15.9% -2.6% 9.9t 7.8% 10.1% 8.~: 
:1980 5.0% -10.9% 18.7% -2.0% -1.0~ -7.8% 0.0% -6.7%: 
:1981/85 4.1% -9.4% 30.4% -3.0% 10.8% 3.8% 13.1% 6.0%: 
:1986/87 5.2~ -8.4% 46.0% -3.8% 5.8~ -3.1% 9.8% 0.9%: 
+---------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Il0'l'&: Values ...y differ fro. earlier tables due to rounding 
table 7 - Break down of the change of the ratio of Do.estic Public Debt to GDP 
+---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
ch. Change of Do•. Contribution of: 
: Debt/GDP Debt
------------------ ------------------------------------------: 
ratio External DQlaestic (r-g) IGDP Growth & + r4/GDP 
-
Seignio­
* 
ratio ratio ratio Interest rage/GDP 
Years (BB/Y) 

1::2+3 2 3=6+7-8 4 5 6=4*5 7 8 

+---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
:1976/9 -0.4% 1.1% -1.5% -13.6% 9.3% -1.3% 7.8% a.a 
:1980 5.0% -1.8% 6.8% -9.1% 10.5% -0.9% 0.8% -6.7% 
:1981/5 4.U: 2.6% 1.5% -8.9% 14.1% -1.3% 8.8% 6.0% 
U986/7 5.2% -2.7% 7.9% -6.7% 28.9~ -1.8% 10.6% o.n 
+---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
ROTI: ValUes ..y differ fro. earlier tables due to rounding 
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Chart 4: 
SEIGNIORAGE 
As a percentage of GOP 
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